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Abstract Knowledge of near misses is helpful in preventing accidents, but it does
not always lead to changes in organizational routines or contribute to accident pre-
vention. In this article, the authors argue that low-probability near misses reinforce
beliefs of experts and professionals in existing routines, proposing a concept of jus-
tification shift. Justification shift is underestimation of risks of known near misses
vis-à-vis overestimation of reliabilities of existing routines. Consequently, signals of
“close calls” tend to be disregarded, and accidents become more likely. When jus-
tification shift occurs, experts and professionals who want changes in routines face
burden of proof about risks of those routines. Uncertainty in requirements and data
may increase the burden and make justification shift more likely. To explore how
justification shift occurs and how uncertainty influences the shift, the authors have
developed an agent-based model based on theories in organizational studies and the
case of the space shuttle Challenger accident in 1986. From the simulation using the
model, it becomes clear that uncertainty does not make a difference in frequencies
and degrees of justification shift. The authors also discuss implications of this finding
to efforts to utilize knowledge of near misses and to further research on the efforts
and organizational decisions.
Keywords Organizational routine · Risk · Near miss · Uncertainty · Burden of
proof · Justification shift
The idea of justification shift first appeared in the paper in the Conference Proceedings of the Second
World Congress for Social Simulation (WCSS-08).
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1 Introduction
Catching as many near misses as possible is considered crucial to prevent accidents
not only for on-site safety and risk management but also for organizational perfor-
mance overall. It is common knowledge today that there are multiple “close calls”
or “weak signals” before an accident (Turner 1976; Tamuz 1987; Reason 1990;
Sitkin 1992; March et al. 1996; Weick et al. 1999; Roberto et al. 2006; Hopkins
2010). Thus, it is expected that experts and professionals are informed of those
problems and that they take precautionary measures. In many cases of accidents,
however, it is also reported that experts and professionals are aware of near misses
but do not change a chosen course of action (e.g., Gioia 1992; Vaughan 1996;
Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003; National Commission on Terrorist At-
tacks upon the United States 2004; Hopkins 2010). In this article, the authors submit
that knowledge of near misses whose probabilities are low actually reinforces beliefs
in existing organizational routines, but so-called uncertainty does not make a differ-
ence in the reinforcement, proposing a concept of “justification shift”. Justification
shift is underestimation of risks of known near misses vis-à-vis overestimation of re-
liability of existing routines. When justification shift occurs, decision criteria on a
chosen course of action change from how a reported event is risky to how existing
routines allow someone to disregard the risk.
Justification shift has three prerequisites. First, it requires near misses, or “gaps”
between what is intended and what is actually occurring. The gaps signal experts and
professionals that existing routines have risks that may lead to accidents. Second,
however, a program, project, or activity has to go through a series of successes in
spite of the gaps. Successes here are different from being without errors and prob-
lems. On the contrary, those enterprises experience issues—i.e., near misses—but the
issues have contributed to organizational learning without causing disasters and de-
manding that experts and professionals abandon existing routines. In other words, the
enterprises go through not a total failure but an “overall success” with which existing
organizational routines are tested, proven or improved, and retained. Finally, third,
a history of overall successes and accordingly surviving routines render “burden of
proof” to those who want to change a chosen course of action based on risks signaled
by the gaps. Overall successes and gaps by themselves may not lead to accidents as
far as informed experts and professionals successfully prove their points with avail-
able data and change existing routines. However, with a series of overall successes,
proving risks in existing routines becomes a demanding task whereas keeping the
status quo becomes easier. Unless experts and professionals overcome the burden,
existing routines are considered more reliable than reported cases of near misses, and
hence, known risks will be disregarded.
In the process, the “void” created by lack of clearly defined requirements and
sufficient data—that is, uncertainty—may aggravate the burden and make it more
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likely for justification shift to become worse in its frequencies and degrees. However,
as explained in this article, uncertainty does not make a difference in qualities of
organizational decisions under conditions that experts and professionals have to make
a decision with available data from fixed probabilities of near misses.
To explore how justification shift occurs and whether uncertainty may or may not
aggravate the shift, the authors have developed a model for an agent-based simula-
tion by mainly drawing on literature about organizational learning, routines, high-
reliability organizations, organizational cognition, and a classic case of the space
shuttle Challenger accident. In the next section, a concept model of justification shift
is developed from existing studies, and a theoretical question about uncertainty is
proposed. Then the agent-based model of justification shift is explained, followed by
a section about results of the simulation. In the last section, the authors discuss theo-
retical implications of the results and justification shift to efforts to utilize knowledge
of near misses in general and future research.
2 Literature review: how justification shift may occur
In the existing literature, near misses are welcomed for a reason; they are help-
ful in preventing accidents by exposing hidden or unnoticed risks and by suggest-
ing how accidents may occur. Although this benefit is true only in retrospect, re-
searchers argue that it is a good strategy to record and study near misses for or-
ganizations and industries. In the field of safety and risk management, the near-
miss management system has been an emerging tool that managers and engi-
neers rely on to improve processes, standards, and procedures (e.g., Tamuz 1987;
Phimister et al. 2003; Macrae 2010; Oktem et al. 2010). In the field of orga-
nizational management, near misses, once they occur, are not a curse that man-
agers should never touch again but a blessing to embrace for a better future. For
example, some argue that near misses are useful to supplement small-n datasets
of large-scale accidents and to explain how those accidents occur (Tamuz 1987;
March et al. 1996). Others even propose to intentionally cause near misses under con-
trolled conditions so that a project can be improved by trial and error (Sitkin 1992;
Harvard Business Review 2011). Researchers on high-reliability organizations ar-
gue that sharing concerns about near misses without hesitation is an essential step
to avoid accidents in disaster-prone organizations, such as the military and nuclear
power plants (Weick et al. 1999).
Near misses in these studies are not always severe incidents with imminent
threats to human life and properties, but their message is clear. Near misses are
precious learning opportunities and should not be wasted. However, it is a differ-
ent story whether organizational learning occurs if their members are informed of
near misses and possible risks in organizational routines. Organizational routines
consist of visible and invisible factors that define how members interact among
themselves and with technologies, such as culture, rules, standards, codes, proce-
dures, and forms (Levitt and March 1988; Becker 2004; Pentland and Feldman
2005). Those routines evolve as members retain workable ones and discard un-
workable ones each time they encounter uncertain situations, and thus routines
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are repositories of results of organizational learning (Nelson and Winter 1982;
Feldman 1984; Battenhausen and Murninghan 1985; Gersick and Hackman 1990;
Cohen 1996; Cohen and Bacdayan 1996; Feldman and Pentland 2003; Becker 2004;
Pentland and Feldman 2005). Organizational learning occurs when members cannot
attain their aspiration levels—in other words, organizational performance is below
their expectations (March and Simon 1958; Levitt and March 1988). Therefore, a
question is whether near misses are sufficient to motivate members to change exist-
ing routines, and existing literature provides conflicting views on this point.
A classic view on organizational routines offers that changes in the routines need
external shocks, which are clear and imminent threats to organizational performance
(Cyert and March 1963; Nelson and Winter 1982; Feldman 1984; Gersick and Hack-
man 1990). In this view, accidents and extremely severe near misses are necessary
for change. A more recent view submits that members proactively change routines
without those shocks by judging which routines are working well in a certain en-
vironment (Edmondson et al. 2001; Feldman 2003; Feldman and Pentland 2003;
Howard-Grenville 2005; Levinthal and Rerup 2006). In this case, accidents and se-
vere near misses are not necessary, but it may be sufficient for members to ob-
serve minor gaps between what is intended and what is actually occurring. In ad-
dition to these two views, case studies and investigation reports on large-scale ac-
cidents suggest that near misses do not lead to changes in organizational routines
(e.g., Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986;
Starbuck and Milliken 1988; Vaughan 1996; Columbia Accident Investigation Board
2003; National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States 2004;
The BP US Refineries Independent Safety Review Panel 2007; Mahler 2009; Hop-
kins 2010; National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Off-
shore Drilling 2011). The case of the 1986 space shuttle Challenger, among others,
illustrates how near misses are insufficient for organizational learning and changes in
routines.
The Challenger exploded 73 seconds after its launch on January 28, 1986, killing
all seven astronauts on board and grounding all space shuttle flights for more than
two years. The direct cause of the explosion was said to be the weather condition
(Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986). A com-
bination of the cold temperature and strong wind tampered with the sealing capability
of O-rings in joints of Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) attached to a propellant tank.
Hot gas leaking from the SRBs encroached into the tank filled with oxygen and hy-
drogen, causing the explosion that disintegrated the orbiter Challenger (Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986). After the accident, the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) was criticized not only be-
cause the accident occurred but also because its managers and contractor recognized
problems with the O-rings but kept expanding allowable limits of acceptable risks
(Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986).
The SRB joints were considered a critical item whose failure would lead to loss
of human life or space shuttles (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Chal-
lenger Accident 1986). Thus, in-flight problems of O-rings that seal the joints could
be called near misses, and before the Challenger, which was the 25th flight of the
space shuttle, there were 14 flights with O-ring problems (Presidential Commission
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on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986:129–131). In most of them, primary
O-rings closer to solid propellant eroded or experienced blow-by, but secondary ones
were working to prevent hot gas from leaking from the boosters. However, in flight
51-C in 1985 with the orbiter Discovery, the primary O-ring was penetrated by soot,
and the secondary ring was affected by the heat of burning propellant. These near
misses triggered actions in NASA and the contractor, Morton Thiokol, Inc. (MTI).
They conducted ground tests, heightened the level of criticality of SRBs as a com-
ponent, set an action item for MTI, circulated memos, established a task force in
MTI and searched for different designs, put a launch constraint, and so on (Pres-
idential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986). In spite of
these actions, their conclusions were always to keep the space shuttle flying with the
risk of near misses, and thus, accidents. In addition, their justifications for the flights
evolved as problems became worse (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident 1986).
For example, after primary O-ring eroded, they justified subsequent flights by
mentioning that the primary rings were doing their job, there were sufficient mar-
gins, or there were still secondary rings. Even after the primary O-ring was pene-
trated in flight 51-C, following flights were approved for the reason that the rings
were exposed to hot gas for limited time and the secondary O-ring would be still
working. According to the report of the Presidential Commission on the Challenger
accident, “NASA and Thiokol accepted escalating risks apparently because they ‘got
away with it last time’ . . . despite a history of persistent O-ring erosion and blow-by
. . .” (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986:148).
In short, near misses provided NASA and the contractor an excuse to proceed with
known risks until the accident actually occurred instead of causing them to change
their routines.
On this insufficiency of near misses to change routines, Dillon and Tinsley (2008),
referring to the case of space shuttle Columbia accident in 2003, provide an expla-
nation from the perspective of managers’ psychology. According to the article, near
misses shift managers’ risk perceptions in an optimistic direction, and as managers
are exposed to more cases of near misses, they become more likely to underestimate
risks. For the managers, near misses in hindsight mean not danger or failure but cases
of success in which actual disasters are avoided. Thus, statistical risks are not cor-
related with perceived risks in their mind. Since a task ends as a success (in spite
of near misses) and perceived risks are low, there are no reasons to change existing
routines. This explanation provides helpful insights to examine how justification shift
occurs. It clearly supports that “gaps” between what is intended and what is actually
occurring and a series of “overall successes” may cancel perceived impacts of near
misses in individuals’ mind.
However, organizational learning and changes in routines, or lack thereof, involve
actions among members as the problem of O-rings induced various actions in NASA
and MTI. They discussed the problem in and beyond their organizations and tried
to sell how serious the problem was, and some of them eventually tried to delay
the launch of the Challenger. However, their actions, or interactions, never changed
what they were doing. There seems to have been something more than individual risk
perceptions in the Challenger case. Here, it is necessary to pay attention to the third
prerequisite of justification shift, burden of proof.
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Burden of proof is a legal concept that a claiming party is obliged to make rea-
sonable people believe that a claim is true beyond reasonable doubts (Simon and
Mahan 1971; Jeffries and Stephan 1979). For example, in criminal cases in countries
where defendants are presumed to be innocent until proven guilty, prosecutors have
to persuade juries and/or judges with “proof” reasonable enough to believe that the
defendants commit crimes. Similar burden rests with those who want to change ex-
isting routines, which means they are responsible for providing proof from cases of
near misses that existing routines do not work as intended and for making their coun-
terparts believe that changing routines is a reasonable choice. However, the burden
may work as a barrier to the changes and thus to organizational learning, especially
when a project, program, or organization goes through a series of overall successes.
Existing literature and the case of the Challenger suggest how the overall successes
lead to the burden and the latter becomes a barrier to change existing routines.
As described in the paragraphs on the insufficiency of near misses, organizational
routines evolve as organizational learning proceeds. Each time members encounter
uncertain situations, they first rely on similar cases to decide what to do, and then
evaluate how their choices do or do not work (Weick 1979, 1995; Battenhausen and
Murninghan 1985). Workable choices are selected and retained, becoming routines,
whereas unworkable ones are discarded. In the process, as Dillon and Tinsley (2008)
explain, near misses are considered overall successes, not disasters or failures that de-
mand that existing routines be discarded. Although minor tuning of the routines may
occur, no drastic changes in the way of doing business follow near misses. Burden of
proof emerges in parallel with this evolutionary process of organizational routines in
the following manner.
First, organizational routines surviving the process become proven and reliable
ones. At least, each time members learn from their choices, repositories of their
learning—that is, organizational routines—become the best available to them. Sec-
ond, as similar near misses are repeated without causing accidents (in other words,
as an organization goes through a series of overall successes), the best available rou-
tines repeatedly prove themselves, reinforcing their reliability. It is considered that
under the same condition, the routines are constantly effective. According to the lit-
erature on organizational learning (March and Simon 1958; Cyert and March 1963;
Herriott et al. 1985; Levitt and March 1988; Huber 1996), repeated overall successes
reinforce the choice of members to keep relying on the routines. Finally, someone
who is concerned about risks that repeated near misses render has to face colleagues
who rely on the best available routines. S/he has to prove that the routines are danger-
ous enough to persuade colleagues of the reasonable need for changes in the routines.
If the burden is successfully overcome, the routines in question may be changed and
no accident may occur. However, with a series of overall successes, proving risks in
existing routines becomes a demanding task whereas keeping the status quo becomes
easier. The case of the Challenger casts a light on how the task is difficult.
The difficulty in overcoming burden of proof is highlighted in the teleconference
between NASA and MTI the night before the Challenger launch. Although the fa-
tal launch decision was a result of actions by experts and professionals over more
than five years, which some called a “normalization of deviance” (Vaughan 1996)
or “fine-tuning odds” until a system breaks down (Starbuck and Milliken 1988), the
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mechanism of burden of proof is the same between the teleconference and the long-
term process. Discussions revolve around why the best available routines do not work
as expected this time although members are facing possibilities of the same near
misses. In retrospect, it is clear that the weather conditions, especially the cold tem-
perature, were deterministic in the case of the Challenger (Presidential Commission
on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986), but to experts and professionals in
the teleconference, they were doing what they had been doing for several years. As
a result, the teleconference became a conflict between those who believed that risks
that near misses suggested were high enough to delay the launch and those who be-
lieved that routines that survived with the near misses were reliable enough to launch
the Challenger.
At the teleconference, the believers of the risks, who were mainly engineers of
MTI but included the Vice President and Director of Engineering, recommended not
launching the Challenger below 53 degrees Fahrenheit because in flight 51-C, the
primary O-ring of SRB joints was penetrated at the temperature (Presidential Com-
mission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986). However, the believers of
routines also had reasons not to support what their counterparts demanded. First,
there was no requirement about the temperature for SRB joints to launch a shuttle or
to cancel the launch (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Ac-
cident 1986). This absence of a criterion left room for different opinions about how
risky the condition was. Second, the MTI engineers could not quantify the risk of the
cold temperature because available data were insufficient; there were only 24 flights
before the Challenger and even fewer cases of the primary O-ring burn-through at ex-
tremely cold temperatures (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident 1986). The lack of data added uncertainty to the demand of the believers of
the risks and contributed to the room for discussions on how SRB joints were reliable
under the condition. Thus, the believers of routines wanted an explanation of why
the launch at the cold temperature would not work this specific time when previous
launches did. In addition, the explanation had to be persuasive enough for them to
give up their beliefs in the proven, best available routines.
In the conflict between the two camps, MTI switched its position from anti-launch
to pro-launch. It justified the recommendation for the following reasons (Presidential
Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986). First, data were not
conclusive enough about the relationship between the cold temperature and O-ring
behaviors. Second, the secondary O-ring would work even if the primary one did
not although the cold temperature might make those rings harder and slower to seal
the joints. Finally, solid rocket motors would not show significantly different behav-
iors between 51-C and this launch of the Challenger, although O-rings of the latter
might become 20 degrees colder than those of the former. In short, the believers of
the risks could not persuade the believers of routines that it would be different this
time. Prior cases of near misses, or a series of overall successes, were used to justify
existing routines, which in this case involved launching space shuttles by expecting
that the secondary rings would do their job. Burden of proof was not overcome, and
the Challenger accident occurred.
The above review shows how the justification shift occurs and decision criteria on
a chosen course of action change from the risk of a reported event to reliability of
existing routines (Fig. 1).
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Fig. 1 A process of the justification shift
First, gaps between what is intended and what is occurring, such as near misses,
are not enough by themselves to change routines. Second, each time overall successes
are repeated, routines are proven reliable, and their reliability is reinforced. At the
same time, burden of proof develops for those who are concerned about risks in the
routines. Third, if those who have concerns fail to overcome the burden, reliabilities
of the routines are overestimated whereas risks of the gaps are underestimated. At this
stage, lack of clear requirements and sufficient data aggravate the burden of proof and
may make justification shift more likely and more severe. In the Fig. 1, “psycholog-
ical distances” from cases of near misses also contribute to reinforce reliabilities of
existing routines in addition to a series of overall successes. The distances determine
how directly agents experience the cases. Dillon and Tinsley (2008) suggest that the
more frequently overall successes are repeated, the more likely that mangers will un-
derestimate risks of near misses. However, behaviors of experts and professionals at
the teleconference in the Challenger case suggest that the frequent exposure to near
misses may not be the only cause of the underestimation.
First, most of the experts and professionals in NASA and MTI went through the
same history of overall successes, and some of them supported the recommenda-
tion to delay the launch (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident 1986). Second, the supporters initially included the management of MTI,
especially the Vice President and Director of Engineering, and a manager of NASA
(Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986). Thus,
their positions and functions did not determine the fault line between the support-
ers and others. Third, however, most of the MTI management was not as determined
about the recommendation as its engineers were, and at the end of the teleconference,
the management of MTI, including the Vice President and Director of Engineering,
flipped the recommendation (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Chal-
lenger Accident 1986). The clear difference between those who were tenacious and
those who were not was the “distance” or, in other words, how closely and directly
they monitored problems of O-rings. Engineers who had directly studied O-rings
never changed their opinions (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Chal-
lenger Accident 1986). In addition, although the Vice President and Director switched
his position, he had been informed of for what those engineers were struggling. This
episode of the teleconference also indicates that experts and professionals are more
likely to believe that existing routines are risky as their psychological distances be-
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come smaller whereas they are more likely to believe that the risk is smaller as the
distances become larger.
The process in Fig. 1 raises an important question on how the justification shift
occurs. The lack of requirements and data is a reason why near misses are pre-
cious learning opportunities (Tamuz 1987; March et al. 1996; Weick et al. 1999;
Phimister et al. 2003; Oktem et al. 2010). It is a contradiction if near misses are
necessary to fill the “void” but the “void” makes near misses ineffective for experts
and professionals to overcome burden of proof. How does the void make it diffi-
cult to avoid justification shift under the condition with which experts and profes-
sionals have to rely only on near misses as grounds of their concerns? So far, it is
clear that accidents may eradicate the void, as NASA changed its safety routines af-
ter the Challenger, although another accident, the Columbia, cast a doubt whether
the changes were truly effective (e.g., Columbia Accident Investigation Board 2003;
Mahler 2009). To answer this question, the authors have developed an agent-based
model and run it on a simulation toolkit, Repast Simphony. The model is explained
in the next section.
3 An agent-based model of the justification shift
In the model, agents are individual experts and professionals. Figure 2 shows the
relationship between the concept model in Fig. 1 and equations in the agent-based
model.
Justification shift is measured by differences between the agents’ beliefs in risks
of near misses and in reliabilities of existing routines. If values of the reliability be-
lief are larger than those of the risk belief, justification shift is considered to have
occurred. In other words,
JS(t) =
{
Occurs if RN(t)i ≤ RR(t)i
Does not occur if RN(t)i > RR(t)i ,
Fig. 2 Equations in the agent-based model of the justification shift
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where JS(t) denotes justification shift at time t , RN is agents’ beliefs in risks of near
misses, RR is the beliefs in reliabilities of existing routines, and i is an index for
agents.
Initial values of RN and RR, which are denoted as RN(t−1)i and RR(t−1)i , depend
on agents’ psychological distances from cases of near misses in addition to prob-
abilities that events end with overall successes. The episode of the teleconference
suggests that values of RN of individual experts and professionals are inverse val-
ues to the distances, or the directness with which they are exposed to cases of near
misses, and values of RR are proportional to the distances. Hence, initial values of
agents’ RN and RR are defined as RN(t−1)i = [Pr(NM)t−1 · (1/D(t−1)i )]/100 and
RR(t−1)i = [(1/Pr(NM)t−1) · D(t−1)i]/100, where Pr(NM) is probabilities that near
misses occur and events end as overall successes, D is the distances between agents
and near misses, 0 < Pr(NM) ≤ 1, and D = {0.1,0.2, . . . ,1.0}. The denominators of
the equations are to control the ranges of RN and RR so that their values do not ex-
plode. It is necessary to take inverse values of the probabilities of near misses in the
equation for RR because otherwise, values of RR become smaller as the probabilities
lower, which is illogical. The above ranges of Pr(NM) and D are set for the following
reasons. First, if no near misses occur, that is, if Pr(NM)t−1 = 0, no justification shift
follows. Second, if D = 0, it means that someone is directly involved in a near miss,
such as a victim of a severe incident. No justification shift follows also in this case.
In the model, values of Pr(NM) are controlled for comparison across runs of the sim-
ulation, but those of D are randomly assigned to individual agents because as shown
in the episode of the Challenger teleconference, none of their positions, functions, or
physical distances from near misses seems to predetermine the values.
With the various values of their RN(t−1) and RR(t−1), agents negotiate for or
against their beliefs. The negotiation determines how agents’ values of RN(t) and
RR(t) change from those at t − 1, and thus, whether justification shift occurs or not at
time t . As explained in the previous section, justification shift occurs unless believers
of risks overcome burden of proof. Thus, agents become the believers of risks and
face the burden if their values of RN(t−1) are larger than those of RR(t−1) are. On the
contrary, agents that have larger values of RR(t−1) than RN(t−1) become those who
have to be persuaded by the former group of agents. In the process, the void created
by lack of requirements and data may make the burden more taxing. The question is
to what extent the void increases the burden.
For individual agents, values of RR(t−1) reflect how they are attached to exist-
ing routines, and those of RN(t−1) represent to what extent they believe risks of
near misses. The episode of the Challenger teleconference suggests that as agents
are more attached to the routines and disbelieving in the risks, they are more un-
comfortable with insufficiencies of data and comfortable with lack of requirements.
In negotiating their positions, the believers of risks try to sell their own values of
RN(t−1) and RR(t−1), but they have to overcome the attachment and disbelief on
the side of their counterparts, which are differences in RN(t−1)i − RN(t−1)j and in
|RR(t−1)i − RR(t−1)j |, where j is an index for believers of routines. The sum of the
differences is equal to burden that believers of risks face in the negotiation to persuade
a believer of routines, thus, B(t−1)j = RN(t−1)i − RN(t−1)j + |RR(t−1)i − RR(t−1)j |,
where B denotes burden of proof. However, B(t−1)j is a minimum value of the burden
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because it does not accommodate effects of the void created by lack of requirements
and lack of data. As the case of the Challenger shows, the effects seem to be more
onerous when cases of near misses are rare because infrequencies of near misses
make it difficult to obtain sufficient data to prove or disprove beliefs in risks and relia-
bilities of routines. In other words, the effects become more cumbersome as probabil-
ities of near misses, Pr(NM), are lower. To satisfy this condition, the equation for bur-
den of proof is changed into AB(t−1)j = B(t−1)j +[B(t−1)j · log10(1/Pr(NM)t−1)] =
B(t−1)j · [1 + log10(1/Pr(NM)t−1)], where AB is “aggravated” burden of proof. The
“aggravated” burden of proof may increase degrees of justification shift by making it
more difficult for believers of risks to negotiate with believers of risks.
In the negotiation, agents make a decision as follows (Fig. 3). At the beginning
of the process, agents check values of RN and RR of their own and other agents.
If RNi > RRi , they are believers of risks, and they try to persuade believers of rou-
tines, that is, agents with RNj ≤ RRj . The goal of the negotiation is to change values
of RNj and RRj to RNi and RRi , but believers of routines resist the attempt de-
pending on values of their AB(t−1)j . The values of AB(t−1) determine the probability
that a believer of routines accepts values of RNi and RRi of an agent in the nego-
tiation, Pr(Rj→i ), with the following equation: Pr(Rj→i ) = | log1000(1/AB(t−1)j )|.
The base value of the log, 1000, has been chosen so that the range of the probabil-
ity becomes 0 ≤ Pr(Rj→i ) ≤ 1. Believers of risks are also vulnerable to influences
of their counterparts in the negotiation, especially if they are at the border between
the two camps of believers, as demonstrated by MTI’s Vice President and Direc-
tor of Engineering changing his opinion about the Challenger launch. Therefore, in
the model, if values of the distance of a believer of risks from near misses, Di , are
smaller by 0.1 than values of the distance of a believer of routines that the former
agent encounters, Dj , the former accepts opinions of the latter, RNj and RRj , with
the probability Pr(Ri→j ) = | log1000(1/AB(t−1)i )|. Since values of the distance is a
set of D = {0.1,0.2, . . . ,1.0}, the vulnerability emerges only for believers of risks at
the border.
Changes in the above variables are compared across runs of the simulation to
examine effects of the void on justification shift.
There are eight conditions for the comparison (Table 1). The probabilities of near
misses in the table are based on hypothetical probabilities (0.042 and 0.583) and
actual ones (0.150 and 1.000) of O-ring penetrations before the Challenger acci-
dent. The hypothetical probabilities are simple odds that O-ring erosions or blow-bys
occurred in the history of the 24 space shuttle flights. If only the severest case of
those erosions or blow-bys, flight 51-C, is considered, the odds are 0.042, which is,
1 out of 24 flights. On the contrary, if all cases are considered regardless of sever-
ity, the odds are 14/24 = 0.583. However, the Presidential Commission argued that
if experts and professionals more seriously examined the cases of heat distress of
O-rings as a function of launch temperatures, the probabilities were 1.000 (4 out
of 4 flights) at temperatures below 65 degrees Fahrenheit versus 0.150 (3 out of 20
flights) above 65 degrees (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger
Accident 1986:146). With these four different probabilities, it is possible to examine
whether the launch decision would have been different if experts and professionals
had been more cautious, as the Commission suggested, even when the only available
sources for their discussions were cases of near misses.
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Fig. 3 Agents’ decision rules
In addition, behaviors of the variables are compared with two types of bur-
den of proof, as shown in the far right column of Table 1. The two types of
the burden are necessary to examine effects of lack of requirements and data on
justification shift. If there are differences in the behaviors between a condition
with minimum burden and that with aggravated one, and especially if degrees and
frequencies of justification shift are larger with the latter, it is possible to say
that lack of requirements and data more likely causes experts and professionals
to commit underestimation of risks of known near misses vis-à-vis overestima-
tion of reliabilities of existing routines. Otherwise, justification shift occurs with a
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Table 1 Conditions for the
Simulation (agents = 34) Conditions Probabilities
of near misses
Types of burden of proof
1 0.042 Minimum burden (B(t−1)j )
2 0.042 Aggravated burden (AB(t−1)j )
3 0.150 Minimum burden (B(t−1)j )
4 0.150 Aggravated burden (AB(t−1)j )
5 0.583 Minimum burden (B(t−1)j )
6 0.583 Aggravated burden (AB(t−1)j )
7 1.000 Minimum burden (B(t−1)j )
8 1.000 Aggravated burden (AB(t−1)j )
series of overall successes, psychological distances between experts/professionals
and near misses, and minimum burden of proof that is not aggravated by lack
of requirements and data. Under the conditions with the minimum burden of
proof, Conditions 1, 3, 5, and 7, Pr(Rj→i ) = |log1000(1/AB(t−1)j )| is changed into
Pr(Rj→i ) = |log1000(1/B(t−1)j )|, and Pr(Ri→j ) = |log1000(1/AB(t−1)i )| is changed
into Pr(Ri→j ) = |log1000(1/B(t−1)i )|. In the simulation, the number of agents is set
to 34, which is the number of participants in the final phase of teleconference the
night before the Challenger launch (Presidential Commission on the Space Shuttle
Challenger Accident 1986:111).
The simulation has been run a hundred times (100 runs) for each of the eight con-
ditions until the steady state is reached. The steady state represents agents’ decisions
after they have been exposed to a series of overall successes. In order to examine
effects of the void by lack of requirements and data, agents’ decisions at the steady
state have been compared across the eight conditions in the following manners. First,
how many believers of routines commit justification shift has been compared with
how many avoid it. Second, how many believers of risks fall into the shift has been
compared with how many avoid it. Finally, degrees of justification shift have been
compared across conditions with the mean of differences between values of beliefs
in risks of near misses (RN) and those of beliefs in existing routines (RR) before and
after agents’ negotiations. These comparisons have led to surprising results and in-
teresting insights on justification shift and agents’ decisions, as explained in the next
two sections.
4 Results of the agent-based simulation on the justification shift
The most important finding from the simulation is that aggravated burden of proof
does not tend to make a difference in frequencies and degrees of justification shift.
Figures 4 and 5 show how many of believers of routines and those of risks fall prey
to justification shift.
From those figures, four points instantly become clear. First, numbers of the agents
that commit justification shift decrease as probabilities of near misses become larger
from Condition 1 to Condition 8, and all agents eventually avoid the shift regardless
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Fig. 4 Justification shift among believers of routines (n = 3,400 per condition)
Fig. 5 Justification shift among believers of risks (n = 3,400 per condition)
of their beliefs after the probabilities become larger than 50 % under Condition 5.
Second, numbers of the believers of routines also decrease as the probabilities be-
come larger. Third, there are no major differences in the outcomes of justification
shift between conditions with minimum burden of proof and aggravated burden of
proof, that is, Conditions 1 and 2, 3 and 4, 5 and 6, and 7 and 8. Fourth, however,
under Conditions 3 and 4, some of the believers of routines avoid justification shift
whereas most of the believers of risks commit justification shift, which raises a con-
cern. Under both conditions, only a fraction of them is as tenacious as the engineers
in the teleconference for the Challenger launch decision were.
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The first and second points do not seem to be surprising at all, and they show that
less uncertainty, overall, may contribute to avoiding justification shift. Under Condi-
tions 5 to 8, even believers of routines eventually and perfectly give up their beliefs
and avoid justification shift. Higher probabilities of near misses under those condi-
tions mean more cases, and thus, more data of near misses and requirements based on
the data. As more data on near misses are accumulated, it becomes easier for believ-
ers of risks to refute their counterparts’ beliefs in existing routines. In addition, it is
more likely that those accumulated cases evolve into stipulated requirements on what
to do with the near misses, such as canceling a space shuttle launch in extremely cold
temperatures. Therefore, burden of proof seems to become more easily overcome,
and justification shift seems to be more likely avoidable. The two points also seem
to support the argument by the Presidential Commission on the Challenger accident
that if experts and professionals had more seriously examined the relationship be-
tween launch temperatures and O-ring malfunction, their decision might have been
different. The probability of near misses under Conditions 7 and 8 is 1.000, based
on the Commission’s finding that if the cut point of the examination had been set to
65 degrees Fahrenheit, the odds of the malfunction were 100 % below that temper-
ature (see Table 1). With that probability, fewest agents among all eight conditions
become believers of routines at the beginning, and those small numbers of believers
eventually avoid justification shift.
However, the benefit of more data and the possibility of no Challenger accident
seem to be overrated for two reasons. First, between two conditions with the same
probabilities of near misses, aggravated burden of proof does not make a difference in
frequencies and degrees of justification shift. Second, experts and professionals in the
case of the Challenger focused on the effects of “cold” temperatures, concentrating
on the severest case of the malfunction at 53 degrees—the launch temperature of
flight 51-C—instead of the four fights below 65 degrees. As a result, the probabilities
of near misses that they faced were far lower than 1.000. These reasons necessitate
delving into the third and fourth points above.
The third point possibly provides an antithesis to the benefit of more data and less
uncertainty. If aggravated burden of proof does not make a difference from minimum
burden of proof, its lack of significance suggests that the void created by lack of
requirements and data actually does not worsen qualities of agents’ decisions, even
when larger uncertainty increases the burden of proof to believers of risks. In other
words, less uncertainty does not necessarily increase the frequency of justification
shift among them. In addition, aggravated burden of proof does not make a differ-
ence in degrees of justification shift. Table 2 shows degrees of justification shift in
Conditions 1 to 4, which are represented by sample means of differences between
values of beliefs in risks and those of beliefs in existing routines before and after ne-
gotiations. If the mean becomes larger, the negotiations cause agents’ belief to shift to
justify existing routines. If not, the negotiations help agents to avoid the justification.
Statistical parameters other than the mean are described in the Appendix (Table 3) at
the end of this article.
In Table 2, the degrees of justification shift are the same between two conditions
if their probabilities of near misses are same, such as Conditions 1 and 2 and Condi-
tions 3 and 4. Thus, not only is the frequency of justification shift almost the same but
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Table 2 Degrees of justification
shift (sample means)
N/A: No samples









also are its degrees the same regardless of burden of proof aggravated by the void in
requirements and data. The same degrees of the shift suggest that more or less uncer-
tainty does not make a difference in precisions of agent’s decisions, especially when
the probability of near misses is lower than 20 %, as in the above four conditions. In
short, the void caused by uncertainty does not make a difference in frequencies and
precisions of agents’ decisions as far as the decisions are based on known risks of
near misses.
The lack of difference implies that unless experts and professionals are facing rare
and clearly problematic situations in which the same near misses repeat in every event
or once in every two events, justification shift is not likely to be avoidable. It also
implies that lack of requirements and data does not seem to be a reasonable excuse
for experts and professionals to overestimate reliabilities of existing routines based
on available data on near misses. In other words, it is probably useless to expect that
another trial should generate sufficient data that may reduce uncertainty. Instead, such
a trial means taking the risk that believers of risks warn without benefiting qualities
of decisions. It is not worthwhile disregarding concerns of the believers of risks with
the excuse that margins to keep going on remain because of incomplete requirements
and insufficient data.
Conditions 3 and 4 in the above figures and table also illustrate the difficulty of
both avoiding justification shift and making lack of requirements and data an excuse
to keep existing routines. Under the conditions, a few percent of believers of rou-
tines and those of risks give up their beliefs. It is especially notable that more than
95 % of believers of risks commit justification shift. As an overall trend, it is clear
that numbers of believers of risks become larger and the ratio of “converters” among
them decreases as probabilities of near misses increase. However, experts and pro-
fessionals make their decision not in the overall trend but with a certain probability
of near misses, which is 0.150 in Conditions 3 and 4. The probability is based on the
odds of O-ring malfunction at the launch temperature above 65 degrees—3 out of 20
space shuttle flights. If there had not been the four cases of the malfunction at the
temperature below the degree, which has been used for Conditions 7 and 8 for their
probability of 100 %, experts and professionals in NASA and MTI should have made
their decisions based on the probability and data from those three cases.
Unfortunately, as shown in Figs. 4 and 5, decisions by the experts and profession-
als under the conditions would have been to go for the launch of the Challenger.
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Although some of believers of routines give up their beliefs, 97–98 % of agents,
regardless of their beliefs, commit justification shift, overestimating reliabilities of
existing routines. Numbers of believers of risks are larger than those in Conditions 1
and 2, but numbers of the converters among them are clearly far larger than those in
Conditions 5 to 8. In addition, no major difference exists in the distribution of agents
that commit justification shift in the two conditions in the figures and in degrees of
justification shift in Table 2. Thus, believers of risks face burden of proof rendered
by their counterparts’ beliefs, but their eventual choices are not influenced by lack
of requirements and data, that is, uncertainty. The probability of near misses in the
conditions, 0.150, means that near misses occur more than once in every ten events.
It may depend on industries and situations whether the probability is considered to be
low enough to neglect those cases. However, regardless of the judgment, outcomes
of agents’ negotiations tend to be overestimation of reliabilities of existing routines
vis-à-vis underestimation of risks of near misses.
The results from the simulation show that aggravated burden of proof, that is, the
void or uncertainty created by lack of requirements and data, does not make a differ-
ence in frequency and precision in agents’ decisions to avoid justification shift. This
finding is especially true when agents have to make a decision based on available data
on near misses or, in other words, a certain amount of data predetermined by proba-
bilities of cases of near misses. Under those conditions, keeping existing routines and
going for another event under an excuse of uncertainty is useless in enhancing qual-
ities of decisions and also equal to wasting warnings by believers of risks. In such a
situation, uncertainty is no more than an excuse to justify overestimation of existing
routines although available data suggest that those routines carry risks on which some
experts and professionals raise a red flag.
Outcomes under Conditions 1 and 2 paradoxically highlight the problems of
wasted warnings and justified routines. The probability of the two conditions, 0.041,
hypothetically replicates the focus of the Challenger teleconference on the O-ring
malfunction at 53 degrees—flight 51-C, 1 out of 24 flights. With that probability,
none of the agents becomes believers of risks at the beginning, and none of them
naturally gives up his or her beliefs because no negotiations occur. The extreme out-
comes depict how the original recommendation of no launch by MTI was a rare case
and how experts and professionals failed to embrace its value at the teleconference.
According to the report of the Presidential Commission, it was actually rare that con-
tractors recommended no launch, although they were allowed to if necessary (Presi-
dential Commission on the Space Shuttle Challenger Accident 1986). As described in
the section on the literature review, the rare warnings by MTI engineers were under-
estimated, and others’ beliefs in reliabilities of the O-ring, that is, those of the launch
routines at the cold temperature, were overestimated. To justify the overestimation,
lack of requirements and data provided believers of routines a foothold, but from the
results of the simulation, the foothold seems to have been no more than an excuse to
keep the launch routines.
5 Discussions and conclusion
This article is about how knowledge of low-probability near misses reinforces beliefs
of experts and professionals in existing organizational routines and under what con-
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ditions underestimation of risks of known near misses vis-à-vis overestimation of the
routines occurs. To explain the process, an agent-based model has been developed by
drawing on the literature of organizational studies and a real-life case of the Chal-
lenger accident. The results of the simulation show that uncertainty due to lack of
requirements and data does not make a difference in frequencies and degrees of un-
derestimation of known risks of near misses vis-à-vis overestimation of reliabilities
of existing routines, that is, justification shift. It is also clear from the results that as
probabilities of near misses become unnaturally high, justification shift is less likely
to occur.
Findings in this study leads to two noteworthy points concerning how knowledge
on near misses contributes to justification shift. First, efforts to collect data on near
misses and to accumulate knowledge on their cases seem to be helpful to avoid the
justification shift, as the overall trend in its frequency shows in the last section. How-
ever, second, once experts and professionals have to make a decision on whether
existing routines are too risky to keep them, making another trial to fill the void cre-
ated by lack of clear requirements and sufficient data will not serve qualities of the
decision. Frequencies and degrees of justification shift do not change even with bur-
den of proof aggravated by lack of requirements and data—in other words, agents’
decisions are not likely to change even without the uncertainty. This point is true es-
pecially when experts and professionals have to rely on available data on near misses
at a specific time of decision, that is, a fixed rate of occurrences of those near misses.
Near misses are helpful to avoid justification shift only when probabilities of near
misses are higher than 50 %. Thus, reporting and recording cases of near misses so
that experts and professionals can utilize the knowledge of near misses is a good prac-
tice. However, if the probabilities are high, it is natural that experts and professionals
will pay attention to the problems. The issue is what occurs when the probabilities
are not as high. From the results of the simulation, they fail to avoid justification shift
in such a case. In this case, risky organizational routines do not change, and experts
and professionals keep working with the routines until external shocks force them to
abandon the routines. In the process, available data provide them not with reasons
to change a course of their action but with excuses to justify it, such as that the risk
does not seem to be risky enough or that there are still margins to go. In other words,
organizational routines become reinforced while they have been surviving with near
misses, and the reinforcement renders burden of proof to those who believe the rou-
tines are risky and want to change them.
The above points imply that in spite of benefits of the near-miss management
system in general, it is another question whether the knowledge is utilized as ex-
pected by the system when experts and professionals make a specific decision on
their next move with low-probability near misses. Findings in this article suggest that
uncertainty in requirements and data is not the cause of the unexpected responses
of experts and professionals to the knowledge, that is, justification shift. At least,
as far as comparisons across the eight models in the simulation go, that uncertainty
is not a problem in terms of frequency and degrees of justification shift. Beliefs of
experts and professionals, whether regarding risks of near misses or reliabilities of
existing routines, have been already established by probability of overall successes
and psychological distances from cases of near misses. When believers of risk want
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to negotiate with those of routines, they face burden of proof rendered by the beliefs
of their counterparts, which may lead to justification shift under some conditions.
However, even if burden of proof is aggravated with uncertainty in requirements and
data, outcomes of their negotiations are same; the same frequencies and degrees in
underestimating risks of near misses and overestimating existing routines.
Then why is the uncertainty mentioned as a reason to make another trial with a
probability of near misses, that is, risky routines as in the case of the Challenger? Ex-
isting studies provide two different explanations, data-driven culture (Roberto et al.
2006) and symbolic information gathering (Feldman and March 1981). Data-driven
culture is a type of organizational culture that demands objective data to make a de-
cision, especially for drastic changes. However, when experts and professionals have
to make a decision with data available from past events, the culture puts them into a
dilemma; to increase accuracy in their decision, they need certainty in the data, but
to enhance the certainty in the data, they need more trials. With this circular demand,
the most likely outcome is doing nothing drastic, in other words, indecision for exist-
ing routines. On the other hand, symbolic information gathering is an organizational
attitude driven by a belief that gathering more information is a good sign to inside and
outside of an organization. In an organization with the belief, experts and profession-
als tend to seek information so that they respond to incentives by the organization,
simply to look for what easily catches attentions, or to show how they are rational
in making their decisions. However, gathered information is not utilized for actual
decision-making because the motive to collect information, at the beginning, is not to
use it. Information is even presented not as it is but rather as it conforms to the belief
in symbolic values of information gathering.
Findings in this article suggest that uncertainty becomes a reason for another trial
because of the symbolic information gathering by experts and professionals. Since
more data do not change how justification shift occurs, data-driven culture, even if
such culture actually exists in an organization, is more likely to be skeletal or ritual-
istic. On the contrary, mentioning uncertainty as a reason not to change existing rou-
tines satisfies an appearance as a rational decision-maker, a good member who shares
organizational values of information gathering, and a smart individual who can select
information that deserves attention. As a result, uncertainty is presented as a reason
not to stop but to keep a chosen course of action although efforts to obtain more
information will actually have no influence on the decision to keep existing routines.
Finally, this study has an implication for further research on how knowledge of
near misses may contribute to preventing accidents. Outcomes of this study show
that individual beliefs about risks and reliabilities of existing routines may change
while experts and professionals are discussing cases of near misses and those changes
eventually become organizational choices. Therefore, it is necessary to explain inter-
personal dynamics and collective decision-making for understanding how the knowl-
edge helps to avoid disasters. Regardless of industries and sectors, such as healthcare,
transportation, telecommunication, process, and utilities, near misses and accidents
become concerns when organizations encounter the public more than when an indi-
vidual takes his/her own risk. In this regard, a true test of the effectiveness of the
near-miss management system is whether organizations, not individual managers or
engineers, respond to the knowledge. Individual choices certainly matter, but study-
ing the relationship between knowledge of near misses and prevention of accidents
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demands perspectives beyond individual perceptions, decisions, and behaviors on
near misses. From these efforts, practical, useful, and effective approaches to near
misses and accident prevention may also emerge.
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Appendix
Table 3 Statistical parameters of degrees of justification shift (Conditions 1 to 4)
Conditions Statistical parameters Believers of routines Believers of risks
1 Sample Size 3,400 0
Mean 0.00 N/A
Variance 0.00 N/A




Confidence Interval∗ N/A N/A
2 Sample Size 3,400 0
Mean 0.00 N/A
Variance 0.00 N/A




Confidence Interval∗ N/A N/A
3 Sample Size 3,126 172
Mean −0.02 0.01
Variance 0.00 0.00




Confidence Interval∗ 0.00 0.00
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Table 3 (Continued)
Conditions Statistical parameters Believers of routines Believers of risks
4 Sample Size 3,138 194
Mean −0.02 0.01
Variance 0.00 0.00




Confidence Interval∗ 0.00 0.00
∗ α = 0.01; mean± N/A: No samples
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